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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Lesal Interiors, Inc. ("Lesal") has appealed a district 
court order entering judgment against it on claims that it 
originally asserted against Colonial DPC Corporation I 
("Colonial") and CorEast Savings Bank ("CorEast").  Colonial was 
formerly the wholly owned nonbanking subsidiary of CorEast, which 
is now under the receivership of the Resolution Trust Corporation 
("RTC").  The district court held that Lesal could not recover 
from Colonial on these claims due to the federal common law 
D'Oench Duhme doctrine1 and its statutory counterpart, 12 U.S.C. 
                     
1
.  See D'Oench Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942). 
  
§ 1823(e).  In addition, the court held that the failure of 
Lesal's claims against Colonial doomed its attempt to recover 
from CorEast based on the theory that Colonial was CorEast's 
alter ego.  On appeal, the RTC defends the district court's 
decision based on 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) and does not contend that 
the federal common law D'Oench Duhme doctrine provides broader 
protection.  Looking to the plain language of 12 U.S.C. § 
1823(e), we hold that this provision does not apply to claims 
against a depository institution's subsidiary, and we therefore 
reverse the order entering judgment against Lesal.  
 Lesal has also appealed a subsequent district court 
order denying its motion for garnishment under N.J.S.A. 2A:17-63 
of a debt allegedly owed by Colonial to Lesal's judgment debtor.  
Because Colonial disputed this debt, we agree with the district 
court that the summary procedure provided by N.J.S.A. 2A:17-63 
was inapplicable here, and we therefore affirm this order of the 
district court. 
  
 I. 
 In 1987, Echotree Associates, L.P. ("Echotree), a New  
Jersey limited partnership, acquired in fee simple an apartment 
complex in Voorhees, New Jersey, known as the Echelon Glen 
Apartments.  Echotree undertook to renovate the apartments and to 
convert them into cooperatives, and CorEast, a federally 
  
chartered savings bank, provided secured financing for this 
project. 
 In December 1988, in order to carry out the renovation, 
Echotree entered into a contract with Lesal Interiors, Inc., 
which specializes in projects of this type.  Under this contract, 
Echotree was obligated to pay Lesal $1,536,000.  In addition, 
Lesal performed further work under change orders for a price of 
$390,000.  Echotree failed to pay Lesal for $778,000 of the 
amount that it owed. 
 In February 1989, Echotree conveyed its fee simple 
interest to Echelon Glen Cooperative, Inc., a New Jersey 
nonprofit corporation.  After this conveyance, Echotree held 
shares in Echelon Glen Cooperative, Inc., as well as proprietary 
leases for many of the cooperative units.    
 In 1990, the conversion project failed.  As part of the 
workout of the loan relationship between Echotree and CorEast, 
CorEast formed a wholly owned subsidiary, Colonial DPC 
Corporation I, a Virginia corporation.2  CorEast and Colonial 
then entered into a settlement agreement with Echotree and its 
managing general partner.  Under this agreement, Echotree 
                     
2
.  The district court found that Colonial used CorEast's 
offices; that "[m]ost or all of Colonial's officers and directors 
were also full-time CorEast employees and/or agents"; that 
"Colonial conducted separate board minutes, but prior to January, 
1991, apparently maintained no corporate minutes"; and that 
Colonial, while a CorEast subsidiary "had no income or employees, 
paid no rent, incurred no office expenses, and paid no taxes."  
Lesal Interiors, Inc. v. Resolution Trust Corporation, 834 
F.Supp. 721, 727 (D.N.J. 1993). 
  
conveyed to Colonial both shares in Echelon Glen Cooperative, 
Inc. and its proprietary leases, and CorEast released certain 
debts and extended new loans.  The "Recital" to the settlement 
agreement stated that "[Colonial] shall agree to . . . pay on 
behalf of Echotree, or indemnify Echotree against, certain 
expenses incurred by Echotree with respect to the [p]roperty."  
App. 296.  Paragraph 6 of the agreement obligated Colonial to 
"pay on behalf of Echotree, its partners and principals . . . 
Construction Payables, in an amount not to exceed $1,180,000 
dollars . . . ."   Paragraph 6 also appointed Colonial as 
Echotree's "attorney-in-fact . . . to negotiate, litigate or 
settle . . . with each of the specifically identified creditors 
shown in Schedule[] C . . . as [Colonial] wishes, in its sole 
discretion."  Id. at 311-12.  Schedule C listed construction 
payables totalling $1,180,000.  Id. at 332.  The first item on 
this list was:  "Lesal Interiors - Amount Completed $690,000 - 
Total $690,000."  Paragraph 28 of the agreement stated: 
 This Agreement and the other Documents are 
solely for the benefit of the parties hereto, 
and may not be relied by [sic] any other 
persons or entities including, without 
limitation, any present or future creditors 
of [Colonial], Echotree, or Michaels 
[Echotree's managing general partner]. 
 
Id. at 330.  Lesal did not participate in and was not aware of 
the negotiations leading to the settlement agreement. 
 In July 1990, Lesal brought suit in New Jersey Superior 
Court against Echotree, Echotree's general partner, Echelon Glen 
  
Cooperative, Inc., CorEast, Colonial, and other parties.  Lesal 
sought recovery from Echelon Glen Cooperative, Inc., Echotree, 
and Echotree's general partner.  As against CorEast and Colonial, 
Lesal sought only to establish the priority of its alleged 
mechanic's lien.   
 In early 1991, the Office of Thrift Supervision 
declared CorEast insolvent and appointed the RTC as CorEast's 
receiver.  In April 1991, the New Jersey Superior Court 
substituted the RTC in the action in place of CorEast, and in May 
the RTC removed the case to the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia.  That court, in turn, transferred the 
case to the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey. 
 In May 1992, Lesal, with leave of court, filed an 
amended complaint containing new counts that sought to recover 
from CorEast and Colonial for the $778,000 due from Echotree.  
Among these new counts were count VIII, which sought recovery 
from Colonial on the ground that Lesal was a third-party 
beneficiary of the settlement agreement, and count IX, which 
sought to recover from CorEast on the theory that Colonial was 
CorEast's alter ego and that CorEast was therefore liable to 
Lesal for Colonial's debts, obligations and liabilities.  In 
addition, count XI sought recovery from CorEast, Colonial, and 
other defendants based on fraud.   
  
 In August 1992, all of CorEast's shares in Colonial 
were acquired by Polis Housing Foundation Corporation VI, a New 
Jersey nonprofit corporation.  Colonial was converted into a New 
Jersey nonprofit corporation. 
 In November 1992, the district court entered a default 
judgment in favor of Lesal and against Echotree and its general 
partner, jointly and severally, in the amount of $778,000, plus 
costs and interest.  In March 1993, the court entered an order 
granting CorEast's and Colonial's motion for summary judgment 
with respect to most of the new counts contained in the amended 
complaint, but the court denied summary judgment with respect to 
counts VIII (third-party beneficiary), IX (alter ego), and XI 
(fraud). 
 In May 1993, the district court held a bench trial on 
these latter counts and subsequently found for CorEast and 
Colonial on all of them based on the D'Oench Duhme doctrine and 
its statutory counterpart, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e).  See Lesal 
Interiors, Inc. v. RTC, 834 F.Supp. 721 (D.N.J. 1993).  After 
observing that Colonial was entitled to D'Oench Duhme protection 
because it was a wholly owned subsidiary of CorEast (834 F.Supp. 
at 730-31), the court applied the requirements of section 1823(e) 
to each of Lesal's outstanding claims (Id. at 731-33). 
 Turning to Lesal's third-party beneficiary claim 
against Colonial, the court first held that Lesal could not 
recover under the settlement agreement because that agreement did 
  
not satisfy section 1823(e)(1), which requires that a covered 
agreement be "in writing."  Id. at 731-32.  The court concluded 
that this provision demanded explicit documentation evidencing 
Colonial's obligation to make payments to Lesal.  Id.  Observing 
that the settlement agreement was "ambiguous both as to whether 
Lesal was an intended third-party beneficiary and as to whether 
Colonial specifically agreed to pay the $690,000 owed to Lesal," 
the court held that the agreement was "an insufficient writing 
for purposes of section 1823(e)."  Id. at 732.  The court also 
held that Lesal's third-party beneficiary claim foundered on 
section 1823(e)(2), which requires that a covered agreement be 
"executed by . . . any person claiming an adverse interest 
thereunder."  Because "Lesal did not participate in the execution 
of the Settlement Agreement," the court reasoned, this provision 
"preclude[d] it from enforcing the agreement against defendants."  
Id.  Finally, the court considered whether Lesal's third-party 
beneficiary claim satisfied section 1823(e)(3), which requires 
that a covered agreement be approved by "the depository 
institution or its loan committee."  Id. at 732-33.  CorEast and 
Colonial argued that this requirement was not met because the 
settlement agreement was never approved by Colonial's board of 
directors, but Lesal contended that this provision was 
"inapplicable to transactions involving a bank's wholly-owned 
subsidiary rather than the bank itself."  Id. at 732.  The court 
expressed skepticism about Lesal's argument, stating:  
  
 Inasmuch as section 1823(e) has been extended 
to transactions involving wholly-owned 
subsidiaries . . . , it is logical to 
conclude that "wholly-owned subsidiary" 
should be read into the statute -- in place 
of "depository institution" -- where the 
agreement in question was entered into by the 
subsidiary and not the depository 
institution. 
 
Id.  The court, however, "refrain[ed] from definitively holding 
that section 1823(e)(3) independently bar[red] Lesal's claim."  
Id. at 733. 
 Turning to Lesal's fraud claim, the court concluded 
that "[a]s this claim necessarily relies upon a non-written 
representation, it too falls within the scope of D'Oench and 
section 1823(e)."  Id.  Finally, with respect to count IX of the 
amended complaint, which sought to recover from CorEast on an 
alter ego theory, the court concluded that it was unnecessary "to 
determine whether CorEast would be derivatively liable on an 
alter ego theory" because "Colonial had not been found liable on 
any count."  Id.  Lesal filed a timely notice of appeal from the 
district court's order disposing of all of these claims. 
 The district court subsequently ruled on the motion 
under which Lesal, relying on N.J.S.A. 2A:17-63, had sought an 
order compelling Colonial to satisfy the default judgment that 
Lesal had obtained against Echotree.  The court concluded that 
this statutory remedy was unavailable because Colonial had not 
admitted that it owed a debt to Echotree and because Echotree had 
  
not obtained a judgment against Colonial.  Lesal then filed a 
second notice of appeal from this order. 
 
 II. 
 A.  We first consider Lesal's contention that the 
district court erred in rejecting its third-party beneficiary and 
alter ego claims based on the D'Oench Duhme doctrine and 12 
U.S.C. § 1823(e).3  The D'Oench Duhme doctrine originated with 
the Supreme Court's decision in D'Oench Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 
U.S. 447 (1942).  In that case, a securities firm, D'Oench Duhme 
& Co., sold bonds to a state bank.  After the bonds defaulted, 
D'Oench Duhme & Co. executed notes payable to the bank and made 
interest payments on them so that the bank could avoid showing 
the past due bonds on its books, but the parties entered into a 
side agreement that the notes would not be called for payment and 
that the interest payments would be repaid.  Without learning of 
the side agreement, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
("FDIC") subsequently insured the bank and, as part of a purchase 
and assumption agreement, acquired a note executed by D'Oench 
Duhme & Co.'s as a renewal of the original notes.  Id. at 453-54.  
The FDIC then sued to collect on the note, and the bank alleged 
in its answer that the note had been given without consideration 
and with the understanding that it would not be sued upon.  Id. 
                     
3
.  Lesal does not seek reversal of the district court order with 
respect to its fraud claim.  See Appellant's Br. at 19, 26. 
  
at 456.  The Supreme Court held, however, that D'Oench Duhme & 
Co. was liable as a matter of federal law based on "a federal 
policy to protect [the FDIC] and the public funds which it 
administers against misrepresentations as to the securities or 
other assets in the portfolios of the banks which [it] insures or 
to which it makes loans."  Id. at 457.  The Court's decision in 
this case is often described as resting on federal common law.  
See, e.g., Boyle v. United Technologies, 487 U.S. 500, 504 
(1988); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105 n.6 
(1992). 
 In 1950, Congress effectively codified the holding of 
D'Oench Duhme by enacting Section 13(e) of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e), and in 1989, as part of the 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act  
(FIRREA), 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(4), Congress extended the 
application of 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) to the RTC.4  There is 
                     
4
.  12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(4) provides, with certain exceptions not 
pertinent here, that: 
 
 [T]he [RTC] shall have the same powers and rights to 
carry out its duties with respect to institutions 
described in paragraph (3)(A) as the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation has under sections 11, 12 and 13 
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act [12 U.S.C.A. §§ 
1821, 1822 and 1823] with respect to insured depository 
institutions (as defined in section 3 of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Act) [12 U.S.C.A. § 1813]. 
 
Paragraph (3)(A) [12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(3)(A)] provides: 
 
 The duties of the Corporation shall be to carry out a 
program under the general oversight of the Thrift 
Depositor Protection Oversight Board including: 
  
authority for the proposition that the federal common law rule 
recognized in D'Oench is not coextensive with the terms of 12 
U.S.C. § 1823(e).  See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. 
FDIC, 32 F.3d 592, 596-97 (D.C. Cir. 1994); FSLIC v. Griffin, 935 
F.2d 691, 698 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1163 
(1992); Hall v. FDIC, 920 F.2d 334, 339 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 501 U.S. 1231 (1991).  Here, however, the appellees have 
not argued that the federal common law doctrine provides broader 
protection for them than does section 1823(e),5 and we therefore 
limit our consideration to that statutory provision. 
(..continued) 
 
  (A) To manage and resolve all cases involving        
 depository institutions -- 
 
  (i)  the accounts of which were insured by the  
                              Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance        
        
   Corporation before the enactment of  
   the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, 
   and Enforcement Act of 1989; and 
 
               (ii) for which a conservator or receiver is 
   appointed after December 31, 1988, and  
   before such date as is determined by the  
   Chairperson of the Thrift Depositor  
   Protection Oversight Board, but not earlier 
   than January 1, 1995, and not later than 
   July 1, 1995 (including any institution 
   described in paragraph (6)). 
 
5
.  See Appellee's Br. at 17-21.  When asked at oral argument 
whether the federal common law doctrine and its statutory 
counterpart differed, appellee's counsel stated that the two were 
"very close."  While she added that there were "some subtle 
differences," she did not, either at argument or in her written 
submissions, identify any such differences, much less any that 
  
 B.  Lesal argues that section 1823(e) does not protect 
Colonial.6  Section 1823(e) states (emphasis added): 
 No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the 
interest of the Corporation in any asset acquired by it 
under this section or section 1821 of this title, 
either as security for a loan or by purchase or as 
receiver of any insured depository institution, shall 
be valid against the Corporation unless such agreement 
-- 
 
  (1) is in writing, 
 
  (2) was executed by the depository institution and  
   
  any person claiming an adverse interest 
thereunder, including the obligor, 
contemporaneously with the acquisition of the 
asset by the depository institution, 
 
  (3) was approved by the board of directors of the  
  depository institution or its loan committee, 
which approval shall be reflected in the minutes 
of said board or committee, and 
 
  (4) has been, continuously, from the time of its 
  execution, an official record of the depository 
institution. 
The term "insured depository institution" in section 1823(e) is 
defined to mean a "bank or savings association" insured by the 
FDIC.  12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(2).  When 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) is 
(..continued) 
would be helpful to her clients.  See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & 
Co., 32 F.2d at 596-97 (common law doctrine is narrower than § 
1823 in that non-fault may be asserted as a defense); FDIC v. 
Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 792-93 (9th Cir. 1974) (same). 
6
.  Lesal also argues that Colonial and the RTC cannot invoke the 
D'Oench Duhme doctrine because the RTC accepted benefits under 
the settlement agreement.  In light of our holding regarding the 
applicability of 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) to Colonial, we need not and 
do not reach this agreement. 
  
applied to the RTC pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(4), the term 
"insured depository institution" must be understood to mean a 
depository institution whose accounts were formerly insured by 
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation and for which 
a conservator or receiver was appointed during the period 
specified by statute.  See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1441a(b)(3)(A) and 
1441a(b)(4). 
 The statutory language that we have highlighted above 
leaves little doubt that 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) does not apply to a 
claim against a subsidiary of an "insured depository 
institution."  Under subsection (2), a claim based on a covered 
agreement is valid only if the agreement was "executed by the 
depository institution."  Under subsection (3), such an agreement 
must be "approved by the board of directors of the depository 
institution or its loan committee" and must be "reflected in the 
minutes of said board or committee."  And under subsection (4), 
the agreement must have been "continuously, from the time of its 
execution, an official record of the depository institution."  
Few agreements between subsidiaries of depository institutions 
and third parties are likely to satisfy these requirements.  Such 
agreements will generally be executed by the subsidiaries' 
officers or directors and maintained as records of the 
subsidiaries.  Therefore, if the language of subsections (2), 
(3), and (4) is taken literally, it would appear to make most 
agreements of such subsidiaries, even if executed in the 
  
generally accepted manner, unenforceable in the event that the 
subsidiaries' parent becomes insolvent.7  Furthermore, 
"[r]equiring bank boards . . . to consider, approve, and record 
every transaction entered into . . . by entities held by the bank 
as investments or subsidiaries . . . would make virtually 
impossible the performance by officers and directors of their 
upper level management and policymaking functions."  Alexandria 
Associates, Ltd. v. Mitchell Co., 2 F.3d 598, 603 (5th Cir. 
1993).  It is most unlikely that Congress intended such a 
result.8   
 In order to give these provisions an arguably sensible 
meaning as applied to a subsidiary, they must be read to require 
that an agreement be executed by the subsidiary, that it be 
approved by the subsidiary's board of directors, and that it be 
                     
7
.  Literal compliance with subsection (3) may raise the 
likelihood that a depository institution could be classified as 
the alter ego of its subsidiary, thus exposing the institution to 
significant risk.  See, e.g., FDIC Rules, 12 C.F.R. §§ 
337.4(a)(2), 362.2(d)(requiring, inter alia, that "bona fide 
subsidiaries" have an independent board of directors and conduct 
business pursuant to independent policies and procedures designed 
to inform customers that the subsidiary is a separate 
organization because such factors are among "the minimum 
necessary to assure the likelihood, in all circumstances, that 
the corporate separateness between a parent bank and its 
subsidiary will be respected."  58 Fed. Reg. 64462, 64469 (FDIC 
1993)). 
8
.  In addition, section 1823(e) governs the validity of a claim 
"against the Corporation," i.e., the FDIC or the RTC, and it is 
questionable whether a claim against a subsidiary of a depository 
institution taken over by the FDIC or RTC constitutes a claim 
against the FDIC or RTC as such. 
  
maintained as an official record of the subsidiary.  This is the 
approach advocated by the appellees,9 but this approach requires 
major statutory surgery.  It requires that the phrase "depository 
institution" be excised from subsections (2), (3), and (4) and 
that the phrase "wholly owned subsidiary" or some equivalent 
language be put in its place.  We are most reluctant to treat the 
language of section 1823(e) in such a fashion, particularly 
because we have found no legislative history showing that 
Congress specifically intended for section 1823(e) to apply to 
claims against subsidiaries.10   
 We are aware that several other courts of appeals have 
held that the common law D'Oench Duhme doctrine and its statutory 
counterpart apply to claims against subsidiaries.  See Robinowitz 
v. Gibraltar Savings, 23 F.3d 951, 956 (5th Cir. 1994), petition 
for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3326 (Sept. 26, 1994); Sweeney v. 
                     
9
.  The district court likewise suggested that, when § 1823(e) is 
applied to a subsidiary, the phrase "`wholly-owned subsidiary' 
should be read into the statute -- in place of `depository 
institution.'"  834 F.Supp. at 732. 
10
.  See Conf. Rep. No. 101-222, 101st Cong. 1st Sess. (1989), 
reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 432; H.R. Rep. No. 101-54(I), 
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 357 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
86, 131-32, 153; Sen. Rep. No. 101-19, 101st Cong. 1st Sess. 
(1989); Conf. Rep. No. 3049, 81st. Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), 
reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776-79; H.R. Rep. No. 2564, 81st 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3765, 
3774; Sen. Rep. No. 1269, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).  See also 
96 Cong. Rec. 10,731 (1950)("[U]nder section [1823(e)] . . . 
certain conditions for the first time are imposed upon a bank in 
the event agreements are entered into between customers of the 
bank and the bank."). 
 
  
RTC, 16 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 291 
(1994); Oliver v. RTC, 955 F.2d 583, 585-86 (8th Cir. 1992); 
Victor Hotel Corp. v. FCA Mortgage Corp., 928 F.2d 1077, 1083 
(11th Cir. 1991).  But none of those decisions relied exclusively 
on section 1823(e), as opposed to the common law D'Oench Duhme 
doctrine, and they are therefore distinguishable on that ground.  
Insofar as those decisions dealt with section 1823(e), however, 
we find them unpersuasive and decline to follow them.  None of 
those decisions addressed the language of section 1823(e), and 
thus none of them confronted the difficulty of applying the 
language of that provision to claims against a subsidiary.   
 The appellees argue that the application of section 
1823(e) to claims against subsidiaries would represent sound 
public policy.   They approvingly quote the following statement 
of the Eleventh Circuit: 
 [A] holding that D'Oench is inapplicable to 
[the subsidiary] in this case would seriously 
undermine FSLIC's policy consideration.  The 
FSLIC has to rely on a financial 
institution's written records and its assets, 
such as wholly-owned subsidiaries, to 
determine solvency for regulatory purposes.   
 
Appellees' Br. at 19, quoting Victor Hotel Corp. 928 F.2d at 1083 
(brackets inserted in brief).  But whatever the validity of this 
view, we cannot alter or ignore the plain meaning of section 
1823(e).  Furthermore, we lack the information and expertise 
needed to decide whether the extension of section 1823(e) to 
claims against subsidiaries would on balance be beneficial as a 
  
matter of policy.  Accordingly, we hold that section 1823(e) does 
not apply to claims against a subsidiary such as Colonial, and 
the order of the district court entering judgment in favor of 
Colonial must therefore be reversed. 
 The question remains whether, in light of this holding, 
12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) nevertheless requires the dismissal of 
Lesal's alter ego claim against CorEast.  The district court did 
not address this question; instead the district court reasoned 
that the alter ego claim failed because Lesal's claims against 
Colonial were barred by the D'Oench Duhme doctrine and 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1823(e).  When a district court decision cannot be affirmed on 
the ground adopted by that court, we have the discretion to 
consider whether that decision can be affirmed on alternative 
grounds, but we need not do so.  Langer v. Monarch Life Insurance 
Co., 966 F.2d 786, 807-08 (3d Cir. 1992).  Here, because the 
parties have not briefed the specific question whether Lesal's 
alter ego claim is independently barred by 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) or 
the common law D'Oench Duhme doctrine, we decline to consider if 
the entry of judgment for the RTC as receiver for CorEast can be 
affirmed on this ground.  The district court on remand can 
consider that question in the first instance. 
 
 
 III. 
  
 We thus turn to Lesal's argument that the district 
court erred in denying its motion for garnishment of Echotree's 
alleged right to indemnification for the default judgment 
obtained by Lesal.  We affirm the district court's denial of this 
motion. 
 Lesal's motion was predicated solely on N.J.S.A. 2A:17-
63,11 which provides a summary turnover procedure that may be 
used only when the garnishee "admits the debt."  If the garnishee 
disputes the debt, a motion under this provision must be denied, 
and the judgment creditor must look to the procedures authorized 
by N.J.S.A. 2A:17-61 and 2A:17-62.  See, e.g., Skevofilax v. 
Quigley, 810 F.2d 378, 383-85 (3d Cir. 1987) (in banc), cert. 
denied, 481 U.S. 1029 (1987); id. at 388 (Becker, J., 
concurring); id. at 390-91 (Stapleton, J., dissenting); Beninati 
v. Hinchcliffe, 126 N.J.L. 587, 20 A.2d 64 (Err & App. 1941). 
 Here, Colonial disputed its obligation to indemnify 
Echotree under the settlement agreement, and consequently the 
                     
11
.  This provision states: 
 
  After a levy upon a debt due or accruing 
to the judgment debtor from a third person, 
herein called the garnishee, the court may 
upon notice to the garnishee and the judgment 
debtor, and if the garnishee admits the debt, 
direct the debt, to an amount not exceeding 
the sum sufficient to satisfy the execution, 
to be paid to the officer holding the 
execution or to the receiver appointed by the 
court, either in 1 payment or in installments 
as the court may deem just. 
  
summary turnover procedure provided in N.J.S.A. 2A:17-63 was 
inapplicable.  We therefore affirm the denial of Lesal's motion 
under that provision, but our decision is without prejudice to 
Lesal's pursuit on remand of the other New Jersey statutory 
procedures that may be employed by a judgment creditor to execute 
on its judgment debtor's unliquidated indemnification rights.  
See Skevofilax, 810 F.2d at 383-85. 
 
 IV. 
 For these reasons, we reverse the order of the district 
court entering judgment for Colonial and CorEast; we affirm the 
order denying Lesal's summary turnover motion; and we remand this 
case for further proceedings on Lesal's alter ego and third-party 
beneficiary claims. 
